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**CITIES AND THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES, FEEDBACK AND PROSPECTIVE
HOW CAN WORLD EVENTS BENEFIT THE POPULATION HOSTING THEM?**

BARCELONA OLYMPIC EXPERIENCE 1981- 2017

LLUIS BRAU, architect / JOAQUIM CLUSA, economist

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PROFESSIONAL CURRICULUMS



LLUÍS BRAU

Spanish Architect UPC, Barcelona. Dipl. In Town Planning, Architectural Association, London.

Consultant in Transport, Planning and Housing for public and private institutions (local authorities, International Institutions, UN-HABITAT); Advocacy planning and NGOs.

He has directed around hundred urban, regional and mobility plans, always integrating Town Planning (architects) and Transport Management (traffic engineers).

Also studies, researches, projects and reports in Spain, primarily in Barcelona Metropolitan Area and also in Cuba, Mexico, Palestine, Angola and Tanzania.

Has always been involved in advocacy planning. Since the hard years of Spanish dictatorship till now in democracy.

He has produced publications, (collaboration in 10 books, 40 articles) on topics related on Town Planning and Mobility and has been teaching town planning in Spain and USA.

He is the current president of the Federació Iberoamericana de Urbanistes, FIU; Has been the Spanish delegate in the European Town Planning Council-Conseil Européen des Urbanistes, ECTP-CEU(2007-2016); Member of the Habitat Professionals Forum, HPF, and the World Urban Campaign (UN-HABITAT)



JOAQUIM CLUSA – Mur&Clusa Associates

Economist (Barcelona University, 1965- 70). M.Sc. in Regional and Urban Planning Studies (University of Reading, 1973 -1975, director: Peter Hall). Partner of Mur&Clusa Associates since 2004.

CV detailed in www.murclusa.cat/curri_prof.htm

Practiser / Practitioner for near 50 years in the field of *Economics of Planned Development* (in 1956 Lichfield terminology), since 1968, and *without any serious professional accident*.

Different posts in *Catalonia Local Administration* (Barcelona Metropolitan Plan, 1969- 71, Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation, 1975- 80 and 1992-95, and *Barcelona Regional*, municipal company for infrastructure planning and delivery, 1995- 2001), *Catalonia Polytechnic University* (Centre de Política de Sòl i Valoracions, 2001- 2004) and in *Madrid* (Ministry of Housing, 1971-73, Madrid General Plan 1981- 82).

Private practice 1981- 1992 (freelance) and 2004- 2017 (in *Mur&Clusa Associates* with Sara Mur, economist), with projects in Spain main cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Donostia -San Sebastian, Vigo, Huesca, Sevilla, Pamplona, Salamanca... general plans) and collaborations abroad in Mexico, Cuba, Argentine, USA and China

About 75 published references detailed in <http://murclusa.cat/publicacions.htm>

Books on *Barcelona new Districts* (Barcelona Council, 1981), *Catalan Local Administration reorganisation proposals* (Fundació Jaume Bofill- Barcelona, 1982), *Sistema de ciudades de Andalucía* (Junta de Andalucía 1984), *Bases para la Ordenación del Territorio de Andalucía* (Junta de Andalucía, 1990), *Mercats Locals de Treball* (Generalitat de Catalunya, 1997) 2000. "Els districtes de Barcelona de 1984: criteris de formació i avaluació de l'experiència" (Aj. de Barcelona, 2000), *Inclusionary housing* (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2010), 2011. "Estratègia vers la ciutat de baixa densitat: de la contenció a la gestió" (Diputació de Barcelona, 2011).

Articles in *Novotecnica* (1970), CEUMT (Centre d'Estudis Urbans, Municipals i Territorials- Barcelona) (1976-1982), *Boletín de Estudios Económicos* (1972), Ciudad y Territorio (1975, 1980, 2002), Información Comercial Española (1976), *Papers* (Barcelona Metropolitan Area) (1992- 1995), *Ciudades* (Valladolid, 1999), *Nota d'Economia* (Generalitat de Catalunya, 1999), *Notes (Ajuntament de Mollet, 2000), *Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia* (2003), **APROIN- Vigo (2004, 2006)** ACE (Catalonia Polytechnic University) (2006) and Revista Econòmica de Catalunya (Col·legi d'Economistes de Catalunya, 1996, 2003, 2011).

Collaborations in different postgraduate courses in Barcelona (UB, UAB and UPC), Madrid, Oviedo, Santiago de Compostela and Valencia.

Pictures producing non tangible benefits



From ARA, May the 21st, 2017




Olympic Stadium built in 1936. A view from Sant Jordi Pavilion, with the telecommunications tower



North Ring Road



Poblenou Olympic Village. 1986 (with railroad tracks, without beaches) and 1992



Physical impact of the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games investments

MAIN THESIS AND METHODOLOGY

Just a bit more than a month ago, anthropologist Manuel Delgado, in a special ARA newspaper supplement (ARA, May 21st, 2017, pp 53), in an article entitled **The birth of a monster**, wrote that (underlines are ours):

We began to know then, under the pretext of the Olympics, what would be a real paradigm of what is now known as **urban marketing**, a strategy to promote and sell the object of which is none other than the same city. It was then that, in the shade of a collective hallucination – the international success of the city - a metamorphosis took place in Barcelona which would not benefit citizens –unable to pay a city that no longer would be his- but of banks, construction companies, large insurance companies, hotel chains, tour operators, etc.

The games were the confirmation that the destruction was going on of what had been a city passionate and popular. What strikes is that the responsible politicians who run this sentence appears as ** leftist **, but above all more hits than those that gave rise to the monster it is Barcelona today are the same that a quarter century later they place and maintain in power a political force promised to dismantle it. These things should be politics.

In the same double page, Josep Acebillo, architect, who was responsible for Urban Projects in Barcelona Council in 1992, wrote that:

...So, without abandoning the punctual projects, it was necessary to enlarge the scale and complexity of the interventions and for that we had the *Olympic project*. The required transformation focused not only in architecture but in infrastructures and systems... All the projects, moreover, was designed for its permanent use to its final destination, having in mind that its function during the Games was only temporal. So the Olympic sites were located in such a way that they could * re- qualify peripheries. An important part was spent on improving mobility in metropolitan scale, with the Ring Road and in order to open to the sea the key was to choose the place where to locate the Olympic Village, in a obsolete manufacturing land with a railway. So we won six kilometers of coastline and urban beaches accessible by subway. The aim was to initiate urban **neo- tertiary** programs to alleviate the consequences of industrial decline. Implementing innovative systems and positioning Barcelona as a touristic city.

Now it's easy to label this policy as obsolete, but we must remember that today it represents an important part of the Barcelona economic base. Many cities around the world suffered from this, but I know that the only solvent transformation from manufacturing model to the neo-tertiary is Barcelona. We are envied everywhere.

Difficult to understand that Delgado and Acebillo are talking about the same city and the same event!. What is also true is that actual Mayor, Colau, won the local elections in 2015 with a different program than the ones who ruled the Olympic transformation, 25 years ago, and new hotel and touristic flats licenses have been stopped recently.

Sure that in this political change the economic situation plays an important part. The metropolitan area still has an unemployment rate of 13%, after 8 years of economic crisis,

housing production and especially affordable housing have fallen and the use of private car in the trip to work has increased since 1991, and a great deal of the manufacturing base has been destroyed. But despite the crisis, the projection of Barcelona in the world due in part to the Olympic event has multiplied by 4 or more (airport passengers, tourists and hotel overnights) or just doubled (congresses participants, contracted space in the Faire, goods managed in the port), apart from the more than 2,5 million passengers in the cruisers, not existed in 1992, and the more than 10 million visitors to the 1992 new beaches.

Important also to remember that in June 1999, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) awarded Barcelona its prestigious Gold Medal – the first time awarded to a place and not professionals) – in honour of the city *commitment to urbanism over the past 20 years* including its *mix of eye-catching, landmark projects, small scale improvements to plazas and street corners, and the team work between politicians and urbanists*.

As a new entrance to this introduction, our survey presents the following results for Catalan respondents with no answers in the negative alternatives:

7. How does the city of Barcelona 1992 see the REALIZATION OF THIS VISION AND THE EVOLUTION of its heritage 25 years later?

CAT SAMPLE (14) Highly Positive 85% / Plainly Positive 8% / Positive with more clears than obscures 8% / Total: 100%.

Our main thesis is that Olympic Games heritage has a very positive balance after 25 years of the event, both in terms of infrastructure and Barcelona projection in the world, due to a fair partnership among politicians, planners and officials, and a fruitful partnership of public and private finance. But also that with a 50% affordable housing in the 4300 flats of the Poblenou Olympic village and with underground enlargement investments (despite it would increase the public bill around an additional 25%), the hpositive balance would have been also a high social results. And that the seeds of the proposals were sown in the 70s on the courage and commitment of the Associacions de Veïns (Neighbourhood associations) fighting for better quality of life in the city against Franco dictatorship, but also that probably without Samarach help from the Olympic International Committee, since 1975-77, still in the dictatorship, the games could not come to Barcelona.

So the paper tries to evaluate the positive experience of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona and to do recommendations by using a survey with the questions and hypothesis our secretariat put to the panel, and making some recommendations to diminish the social cost of some *urban marketing* policies and infrastructure implementation in *planetary events*

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE 1992 BARCELONA OLYMPIC GAMES WITH A BID INITIATED IN 1981 (OR 1977)

From Calavita, Clusa. Mur and Weiner, 2010:

Franco, Spain's dictator for more than 35 years, gained power at the end of the so called 1936-39 Spanish Civil War (80 years ago!), initiated by himself. After a long period of international isolation, Franco ended his autarchic economic policies in 1959, stimulating a period of impressive economic growth until 1973- 75 because the *oil crisis*, coinciding by his death. As millions of people migrated to the majors cities from the south and the countryside, Spain experienced the rapid expansion of cheaply built high-rise-towers on the urban periphery and increased densification in city centres.

Following Franco's death in 1975 (41 years ago!), the transition to democracy led to estate elections in 1977, and the following year, the establishment of the Spanish constitution; and in the following year the first municipal democratic elections. The new constitution attempted to settle age-old issues of centralism, nationalism and separatism that Franco's dictatorial regime had buried, but certainly not resolved. The result was the creation of 17 autonomous communities, of which 3 – Basque country, Navarra and Catalonia – were more autonomous than others. High levels of autonomy, however, have not quelled aspirations for complete separation in Basque Country and in Catalonia.

Spain jointed the European Union (EU) in 1986, and the euro was implemented in 2002, in the group of 12 founders. With EU support through the European Regional Fund and the liberalisation of its economy, Spain increased its GDP, improved its infrastructure. Attracted foreign investment, and reduced its unemployment rate. A real estate boom that began in 1997 had nearly tripled housing prices by 2007, contributing to raising inflation and growing family indebtedness. In 2007- 2008 the *construction bubble burst* and *the party (annual GDP increases of more than 3%) was over*.

So the winning 1986 Olympic bid (only 7 years after the first local democratic elections) was part of the social and political movement in Barcelona and Catalonia to be in the *world map*, after years of dictatorship and an *ugly city* (both centre and periphery), with a permanent *inferiority and jealousy complex* respect to Madrid impressive growth and modern road and public transport infrastructures since the 60s, when it started to overcome Barcelona province in population, occupation and health.

Professor Calavita, wrote two weeks ago:

I do feel that Barcelona was successful in transforming itself from a GRAY industrial city to a city where tourist and economic activities flock as a result of the Olympics, when the city opened to the sea, infrastructure was built, etc.. Yes, it was skilled political entrepreneurship and creative planning that made it possible. But the Barcelona success story is not something that can be emulated easily.

First, and most importantly I feel, was the unleashing of a tremendous amount of energy, good will, creativity, collaboration, synergy, etc. brought about by the transition to democracy. It was made possible by the spirit of change, having languished for decades under the corrupted dictatorship of Franco,...There was an explosion of energy difficult to replicate anywhere else. Secondly, as I pointed out in the article "Behind Barcelona' Success story" it was during the transition period that the seeds for the transformation of Barcelona were planted (Solans and Serratos roles)

We must add that when Samarach (*the Olympic boss* since 1980, approximately) was still a Spanish ambassador in Moscú, during the so called *transition to democracy* expressed to Mayor Socias his interest to bring the Games to Barcelona in the future. Serra the first democratic Mayor since 1979 followed this aim and Maragall, Mayor since 1981, presented formally the Barcelona bid. Important to say that the bid was accompanied by a list of volunteers of more than 40.000 and it was a basic component for the bid to be won.

It is also important to remember that the economic situation was very similar to the actual one, with a level of unemployment, in 1981, of more near 20%, because Catalonia and Spain was in the middle of the severe crisis initiated in 1973-75 with the oil crisis. So the infrastructure programme was designed to attract investment to the cities affected by manufacturing closures. The next image from Clusa 1999- 2002 is a fair picture of that situation.



The Olympic Games as an "excuse" or a "reason" to concentrate investment...

- 1975-1980: economic crisis and high unemployment rates (= 20%). Income per capita 85% of UE average (1980).
- Important metropolitan infrastructure shortfall (Metropolitan Region: 4.2 million inhab.-3,300 km² /Barcelona city: 1,7 millions-100 Km²- Catalonia 6 million.)
- (POLITICAL CONTEXT: from dictatorship to democracy. 1979: first local democratic elections).

INFRASTRUCTURE
as an instrument to
address these
problems

The present economic situation can be characterised by a slow recovering after a near the 8 years *terrible crisis* initiated in 2008, in which GDP and employments decreased nearly a 20%, and a 20% of families now being below of the poverty threshold, with increasing inequalities. The state as a whole was nearly was nearly the *bailing out* by the EU during the crisis.


The present political situation in Catalonia can be illustrated by the image of the 2013 400 Km peaceful human chain, and the millionaires independence demonstrations, every year, after the 2010 Constitutional Court sentence against the new regional autonomous constitution, already voted in referendum. And this situation is qualified as *exciting and promising* for a part of the country and as *boring* by another part, both relevant in number, and therefore not negligible.

So certainly we could agree with the Financial Times of 11th March 1999, qualifying Barcelona as *a successful story of a proud and fruitful city*. But now, after more than 8 years crisis, we must add *with some important gray*, about the benefits they aroused, in the field of tourism (with the danger to die of success) and increasing housing prices and rents.

TERRITORIAL CONTEXT AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 1992- 2016

The Olympic bid is won by a city and a council. And the council's Mayor is the visible leader of the Games, and receives the flag from the former city (Seul, in this case), and gives the flag to the next one (Atlanta in this case).

The municipality of Barcelona has an area of 102 Km² (similar to Paris within the *Périphérique* ring road) from which 25 Km² are mountains – Tibidabo and Montjuïc) and a resident population (*night population*), of 1,6 million (sensibly maintained between 2001 and 2016), with near 1 million jobs located (*day population*)¹ (sensibly below Paris). It is the capital (we say *cap i casal*) of a metropolitan area (MA) of 3,3 million inhabitants (accounting 50% of the Catalan population), in a radius of about 15 km from the centre, and a metropolitan region (MR) of 4,7 million inhabitants (the 6th or 8th European metropolitan regions in resident population, according different criteria), in a radius distance from the centre of 30 km North-South and 50 Km East-West . Barcelona accounts for the 27% of the Catalonia region with 7,5 million inhabitants, approximately 14% of Spain population (19% in GDP).



TERRITORY	AREA (Km2)	Population 1991	Population 2016	% Change 1992- 2016	% Annual Change 1992- 2016	% related Catalonia region
BARCELONA MUNICIPALITY	102	1.643.542	1.608.746	-2%	-0,1%	27%
METROPOLITAN AREA (28-36 councils)	585	3.037.793	3.226.600	6%	0,2%	50%
METROPOLITAN REGION (123 councils)	3.235	4.264.422	4.747.035	11%	0,4%	70%
CATALONIA REGION (948 councils)	31.895	6.059.494	7.448.332	23%	0,8%	100%
SPAIN	505.370	39.723.350	46.445.828	17%	0,6%	

EMPLOYMENT SOCIAL (SECURITY FILES)	1991	2016	% Change 1992- 2016	% Annual Change 1992- 2016
BARCELONA MUNICIPALITY	761.165	927.352	22%	0,8%
METROPOLITAN AREA (28-36 councils)	1.142.145	1.593.995	40%	1,3%
METROPOLITAN REGION (123 councils)	1.587.387	2.104.246	33%	1,1%
CATALONIA REGION (948 councils)	2.246.545	3.069.749	37%	1,3%
From Census 1991. Trips attracted				

¹ We deduce an estimation of 100.000 jobs from the Social Security files, to account for the jobs located elsewhere in the province but declared in the company Barcelona central office.

DISPOSABLE INCOME PER CAPITA (CURRENT PRICES)	1991	2016	% Change 1992- 2016	% per year
BARCELONA MUNICIPALITY	9.610	21.267	121%	3,2%
METROPOLITAN AREA (28-36 councils)	8.547	18.385	115%	3,1%
CATALONIA	8.147	16.500	103%	2,9%

despite the crisis 2008-2015

PTA to € at 167 PTA/€

Until 2007, Barcelona, its metropolitan region (MR) and Catalonia enjoyed an important economic growth, in part due to the *Olympics push*. However, after 8 year crisis started in 2007-2008, unemployment is still in 15% in Catalonia, although only 13,2% in the MA, after having reached more than 20% 2012-2013. The comparatively better economic behaviour of Barcelona and its metropolitan area is due in part to the touristic push and directional service activities, due to the push of the Olympics. Despite the crisis the *disposable income per capita* (in current prices) still grew during this 25 years period by an average of 3,2% per year in Barcelona municipality and 2,3% per year in the MA. Since 1993 Catalonia has received 62.079 M€ of foreign investment, being the record in 2016 with 5.051,5 M€

the main negative dynamics are in unemployment, loss of manufacturing base, affordable housing production and the use of private transport in the trips to work, with the following results:

UNEMPLOYMENT	1991	2016	% Change 1992- 2016	% Rate 1991	% Rate 2016
BARCELONA MUNICIPALITY	66.557	79.056	19%	10%	12%
METROPOLITAN AREA (28-36 councils)	140.168	177.988	27%	11%	13%
METROPOLITAN REGION (123 councils)	203.300	343.860	69%	11%	14%
CATALONIA REGION (948 councils)	276.355	593.600	115%	11%	15%

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY STRUCTURE	Barcelona 1991	Metropolitan Area 1991	Metropolitan Region 1991	Catalonia 1991	Barcelona 2017	Metropolitan Area 2017	Metropolitan Region 2017	Catalonia 2017
agriculture	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
manufacturing	28%	33%	36%	37%	7%	10%	13%	15%
construction	8%	8%	8%	9%	3%	4%	5%	6%
services	65%	60%	55%	54%	90%	86%	82%	78%

HOUSING PRODUCTION (finished units)	1991 Total	2016 Total	% Change 1992- 2016	1991 Affordable Housing	2016 Affordable Housing	% Afford-ble Hosing 1991	% Afford-ble Hosing 2016
BARCELONA MUNICIPALITY	2.503	1.291	-48%	137	354	5%	27%
METROPOLITAN AREA (28-36 councils)	8.023	1.466	-82%	241	514	3%	35%
METROPOLITAN REGION (123 councils)	16.906	3.167	-81%	461	724	3%	23%
CATALONIA REGION (948 councils)	37.394	6.176	-83%	1945	868	5%	14%

TRAVEL TO WORK BY MEANS PUBLIC / PRIVATE	1991 BY CAR AND SIMILAR	2011 BY CAR AND SIMILAR
BARCELONA	27%	33%
METROPOLITAN AREA	41%	36%
METROPOLITAN REGION	45%	49%

DATA SOURCE:

1991 Data. *DINÀMIQUES METROPOLITANES A L'ÀREA I REGIÓ DE BARCELONA* (1994), Mancomunitat de Municipis de l'Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona, diferents autors (including Joaquim Clusa)

BARCELONA ECONOMIA - Quaterly Issues. Barcelona Council

ANUARI ESTADÍSTIC DE CATALUNYA, Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya. Annual publication.

A.M.B. (Barcelona Metropolitan Area). *Dades bàsiques dels municipis metropolitans* (anual). 2017.

http://www3.amb.cat/repositori/Estudis%20territorials/Dades_municipis_metropolitans_2016.pdf

First of all economic changes is a question of world economic situation and conjuncture. Secondly it is also a relation with Spanish economic evolution (both GDP changes are highly correlated), receiving nearly 35% of imports and exports of Catalan economy. Thirdly Barcelona

economy reflects also the evolution of the whole Catalan Economy (about 35% of its GDP in foreign exports).

But what is certain is that the *world projection* of the city is directly related to the *Olympic event*, which it is the most important *planetary sport event*. The figures of 1992- 2016 dynamics are simply impressive:

AIRPORT, PORT, TOURISM, TRADE FAIR AND BEACHES	1992	2015	% Change 1992- 2015	% Annual Change 1992- 2016
Airport (.000 passengers)	8.976	39.711	342%	6,7%
Port (Tm goods managed)	18.359	40.392	120%	3,5%
Port (.000 passengers in cruises)	-	2.540	--	
Hotels (.000 overnights)	4.308	16.612	286%	6,0%
Tourists (.000 persons)	1.592	8.303	422%	7,4%
Barcelona Fair (m2 contracted) (Mobile Congress, Microsoft, Alimentària...)	477.886	736.990	54%	1,9%
Congresses (.000 participants)	260	580	123%	3,5%
Beaches visitors (.000 persons)	n.a.	10.429	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Barcelona economia

Growths of about 4, 6 and 7% annually during 25 years despite the crisis in tourist attracted (mainly foreigners) (more than 8 million), airport passengers (near 40 million), goods managed in the port, hotel overnights or congresses participants (580.000, including the World Mobile Congress in the past 4 years and in the near future) .

Surely that for Paris, being one the main important touristic destinations of the world (together with London and New York) are modest figures in the *champions league*, but for Barcelona that did not even compete before 1992, are exceptional.

RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE *BARCELONA MODEL *

Apart from Delgado criticism already presented, it is an interesting context for our evaluation a recent paper from Juli Ponce, academic in the law field, which it is summarised in the following graph:

Barcelona model	Problems	Real Barcelona
Urban projects linked to international events (Olympic Games 1992, 2004) and economic growth linked to housing bubble.	Crisis, unemployment, foreclosures	Domestic problems which need a plan, time and efforts (wicked problems)
No affordable housing: emphasis on public spaces, design, public infrastructures	Lack of affordable housing	(enforceable) Right to housing: empty flats, rent controls, cohousing
Promotion of tourism. More hotels	Impacts of tourism	Control and limits of apartments for touristic uses: the Airbnb battle
Public Private Partner Partnership (PPP)	Inequality	Plan for recovering neighborhoods, energy poverty and utilities
	Gentrification, segregation	Mixing affordable housing, helping schools and students
Environmental sustainability is not a priority	Environmental problems (pollution, etc.)	Implementing new environmental measures

Juli Ponce, March 2017, mimeo. Presentation at the Georgia State University- Atlanta (former olympic city)

He said in the mail:

I have recently had the chance to deliver a lecture in the Georgia State University about the changes in city planning and housing in Barcelona. The basic thesis of the same has been that we are in transition from the old called Barcelona model to a new model for the real Barcelona. The intention is to collect the main ideas in an article that will be published in English here, to disseminate the changes underway. Attached is the presentation and also the essential picture included in the same, comparing the main characteristics and shortcomings of the old Barcelona model, the problems it has generated and how the new model that is emerging with the new local government is facing them.

Looking the graph one tends to think the *Barcelona model* that all actual Barcelona problems (crisis / unemployment, companies foreclosures / lack of affordable housing / impact –negative- of tourism / inequality / gentrification, segregation / environmental problems), directly due to the old *Barcelona model* (urban projects linked to international event – 1992 and 2004- / economic growth linked to the construction bubble / priority in public spaces, design and infrastructure no investment with affordable housing / promotion of tourism with more hotels / private- public partnership in urban development / and environmental sustainability not being a priority).

The newer model should be characterised by the following elements:

- Domestic problems which need a plan, time and efforts (wicked problems)
- (enforceable) right to housing: empty flats, rent controls, cohousing
- Control and limits of apartments for touristic uses: the Airbnb battle
- Plan for recovering neighbourhoods, energy poverty and utilities
- Mixing affordable housing, helping schools and students
- Implementing new environmental measures

In the line of planners *incrementalism ideology*, all the aims and measures mentioned seems very reasonable, right and necessary. The problem is to have forgotten to mention that the present economic situation is also the result of an income per capita growth rate of about 3% (at current prices) since 1992 and that the tourism industry accounts for around 15% of the total employment in Barcelona. Foreign investment in the real estate market and in the manufacturing is account of more than 30% of Spain at this moment. So Ponce analysis should lack of appreciating the benefits from the *Barcelona model* and which part is due to the working of *market forces* of all economic system in a globalised world economy (*construction bubble* included).

Also relevant what professor Calavita, has remembered us recently: Manuel Delgado, in his *The birth of a monster* raises very good questions about how the city has become a "monster" a city where its citizens cannot afford to live, that has lost its soul. This is happening in San Francisco/Bay Area and other highly successful cities in the world. It is not the fault of the Olympics. It is the fault of the Global economy and the inability of cities to counteract it, to put limits on "prosperity." Very difficult politically, too many powerful interests that benefit from growth. How has the Gini coefficient changed?.

MAIN FIGURES OF INVESTMENT AND FINANCE OF THE 1992 OLYMPIC EVENT

Calavita, Clusa, Mur and Weiner wrote in 2010:

In preparation for the 1992 Olympic Games, the City of Barcelona transformed its public infrastructure and facilities by building a new ring road² and drainage system; reclaiming the water front; and building new public, plazas, parks, and sport venues. These facilities benefit from significant central and regional government grants, with much of the investment concentrated in selected locations, termed *new city centralities*. (Marsahll 2004, Calavita 2010).

The Olympic housing program redeveloped a number of Barcelona's old manufacturing areas to create THREE OLYMPIC VILLAGES containing about 4.500 units to house athletes, journalists and referees. These units were sold on the open market after the event³, even though the city's population – especially the number of its young people – was decreasing because its high housing costs. While highly success at many levels, the transformation of Barcelona in the 1980s and early 1990s left untouched its affordable housing deficit. The housing bubble between 1997 and 2007 only exacerbated the city's housing affordable problems.

After the 1992 Games, the city's renewal policy focused in major projects. The most emblematic of these is a 252 hectare area where Barcelona meets the Mediterranean and the Besòs river. The planning culminated in 2002 with the Forum Universal de las Culturas, which succeeded in upgrading and integrating exiting infrastructure (e.g., plans for sewage treatment and alternative energy) with a Convention centre, hotels, and other facilities as well as with the

² In fact, the only segregated one

³ Approximately 50% sold before the event

redevelopment of La Mina, a public housing project in need to renewal. The main goal of another project, the Poblenou 22@, was to attract high- tech industries to a centrally located district that was a mix of housing and disused industrial plants. A recently approved plan in the northeast for La Verneda, a large manufacturing area, has a potential to create 8.000 housing units and 6.000 jobs. La Marina de la Zona Franca, an area in the south western part of Barcelona, has a some housing, but was comprised mainly of industrial plants, some of which are still active. It was seen as an area where the housing, including as much inclusionary housing as possible, could be concentrated.

The economic figures come especially from Brunet (1993, 1995) and Raymond (1994), and they are the following ones (Clusa, 1999):

- Total cost: US \$ 9,376 (1,100,000 million Pesetas) - 6.600 M€ (at 2002 rate).
- Comparative figures. Other Olympic Games in millions of US dollars: Seoul '88 (3,155); Los Angeles 84 (522); Montreal '76 (3,175); Tokyo '64 (16,826). Only Tokyo spent more than Barcelona.
- Management the Olympic Games ("event"): 15% of the total cost (162,000 million Pesetas):
- Olympic Committee expenses: 196,000 m. PTA, including 17% spent on sports facilities.
- Investments in infrastructure and buildings ("agreed investment"): 85% of total expenditure (957,000 m. Ptas.).
- Economic importance of total expenditure: (Catalonia's 1991 GDP: 10,3 bn. PTA): 1.8% over 6 years (10.7% of 1991 Catalonia GDP)⁴.
- Breakdown of investment: Roads (42%), including service galleries; Housing and Offices (15%); Hotels (13%); Telecommunications (13%); and others (17%).
- Publicly managed funds (Application): 72% of total expenditure (807,000 m. Ptas.)/ 67% of investment in infrastructure (644,000 m. Ptas.).
- Public sector funding (budget general resources- Origins): 40% of total expenditure/ 47% of infrastructure investments (450,000 m. Ptas.). The remaining 53% of investments were funded by proceeds from real estate asset sales, road tolls, etc.
- Olympic Holding (HOLSA) management. HOLSA (partnership between the City Council and the Spanish Government) managed 275,000 m. Ptas. – 43% of total publicly-managed expenditure.
- Funding from the Barcelona Municipal Budget: 79,100 m. Ptas. – 18% of total public funding (23,000 MPTA in the 1987-1992 budgets).
- The Olympic debt burden borne by the Barcelona Municipal Budget: approximately 20% of total investment capacity over 20 years.
- Multiplier effects of municipal investments and plans: 5.7:1 in public investment, 14:1 in total direct expenditure.
- Spanish Government funding: 185,000 MPTA. – 41% of total public funding. This represented a 35% increase over Central Government investment in Catalonia between 1987 and 1992⁵.
- Regional Government funding: 143,000 MPTA – 32% of the total public investment burden: 18% of the Regional Government's total investment between 1986 and 1991.
- Total impact on the Catalan economy: 3:1 multiplier, creating
- Employment impact: According Brunet, the impact "was an annual average employment in 1987-1992 related with the direct spendingof 35.309 jobs....related with the induced impact....of 24.019 jobs....so, the annual average employment was.....59.328 jobs for the period 1987-1992 in the municipality of Barcelona..." (Brunet 1993, page 237). Raymond (1994) indicates the "creation of 160.887 from January 1987 to August 1992was 30.000 of annual average...".

From Clusa 1999- 2002:


⁴ The only comparative figure available is the 5% of the GLC GDP for the 2012 London Games

⁵ The amount of investments from Central Government in Barcelona province and Catalonia in 1988-91 were never higher than Madrid and Andalucia ones



Expenditure associated to the Olympic Games

- Total: ≈ \$ 10 billions
- Olympic event: \$1,635 millions (17%) (small part of the whole operation).
- "Agreed infrastructure" program: \$8,012 millions (83%). "List" for VAT exemption.
- Comparisons:
 - Tokyo 64: \$16,826 m
 - Montreal 76: \$3,175 m
 - Los Angeles 84: \$522 m
 - Seoul 88: \$3,155 m



Main projects

- Stadium renewal
- Construction of new Sports Palace
- Ring Road (approx. 35km)
- Additional new motorways (approx. 35km)
- 4.500 new flats in the 4 Olympic Villages
- 2 Communication Towers
- 5 new centrality areas (offices)
- Airport enlargement (offices and housing)
- Leisure port improvement
- Cultural facilities (museums, etc)
- 5,000 new hotel rooms
- 5 km of new beaches: Barcelona opens to the sea



Breakdown of the investment

- Road and transport: 42% (**Ring Road, a bottle neck of the city**)
- Housing and offices: 15%
- Hotels: 13%
- Telecommunications: 13%
- Sport Equipment: 9% Others: 8% (cultural facilities...)
- **"Sport" as a "catalyst" for concentrating investment**



"Origin" and "management" of the funds

Origin	Management-Application
● Public sector ■ 47% infrastructure investments ● Private sector ■ 53% infrastructure investment	● Public sector: ≈ 60% ● Private sector: ≈ 40%



Public actors of the process

- Barcelona City Council: 18% of public funding
- Provincial Government and Metropolitan Institutions: 9% public funding
- Regional Government: 32% public funding
- Central Government: 41% public funding
- **≈20% of overall public investment of the period 1987-1992**



Economic impact of the O.G.program

- Economic importance of total expenditure: 10.7% of 1991 Catalonia GDP (**1.8% GDP over 6 years**)
- **Employment increase** in the Metropolitan Region 1987-1992: **28% in 6 years, due to the economic cycle** and also the OOGG program.
- **Direct Employment creation:** Annual average for 1987-1992 (5 year jobs). Two estimates:
 - Raymond (1994): 30.000 jobs
 - Brunet (1993): 60.000 jobs

POBLENOU OLYMPIC VILLAGE=

79 Ha - 500.000 sq.m. floorspace- 0,65 m2 built/m2 land - 50% housing – 2.400 flats – 50% Open space

Vila Olímpica		units	
	m2 sostre	unitats	m2/unitat
Habitatges de Vila Olímpica	244.741	1.976	124
Habitatges de Can Serra	64.777	523	124
Hotel de les Arts (exc.aparcaments)	93.000		
Torre Mapfre (exc. Aparcaments)	49.000		
Altres usos (comercial i oficines)	124.771		
Eurocity			
Telefónica			
Centre comercial			
Port (Sport Ships Sites)		1.000	
Parkings- Public+Underground (Cars capacity)		1.160	
Equipaments	18.512		
Edificabilitat total	530.024		
	m2 sostre		
Usos públics	18.512		
Edificabilitat usos privats	511.512		
	m2 sostre		
Edificabilidad Usos Privados			
m2t/m2s	0,648		
Net floorspace ratio (sq m floorspace/total land area)			

Half a million sq m for 79 Ha!!

Open Spaces 50% aprox.

flats in the Olympic Village
flats in neighbour area-Can Serra

other uses
office building 2
Telephone headquarters
Commercial Centre
Port

Total floorspace

Public Floorspace

"Private-non public" floorspace

STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF BARCELONA 1992 OLYMPIC EXPERIENCE

There is a number of useful Town Planning lessons to be learnt from the management and funding of the Olympic Games in order to assess the global sporting value from the economic point of view. The salient points can be summarised as follows (Clusa 1999-2):

- **The big infrastructure deficits** which had to be solved in the "Metropolitan City" of the 1980s concerned the ring roads (B-20 and B-30), the airport, telecommunications, and hotels, as well as the economic development promotion, was the main objectives to be fulfilled with the applications. Most of the infrastructures were planned in the 60s and the Olympic event got the finance for them. Even the renewal of Poblenou area to host the near 4.300 flats for the Olympic village was already a plan presented in the past, with citizens opposition during the dictatorship time.
- **The usefulness of a world event** like the Olympic Games as a means of concentrating public and private investment. The event itself only represented 15% of total expenditure of "agreed" investments (1.1 thousand million Pesetas, equivalent to near 10 billion US \$, of that time). Sports facilities only accounted for 9% of total expenditure.

- **The leading role played by the Barcelona City Council** in planning projects and ensuring that high standards were met in their implementation. Fully 39% of investment was in the Barcelona municipality, 25% in the rest of the Metropolitan Region, 16% in the rest of Catalonia, whilst 20% covered general infrastructure (telecommunications, etc.).
- **Collaboration between the private and public sectors** since public funding would have proved insufficient by itself. In monetary terms, the public sector managed 65% of investment, although its net investment was only 45% of the total since the private sector funded dwellings in the Olympic Villages (all of the 4.100 dwellings were completely sold in 1995, of which 2.200 were in the Olympic Village). About 800 of them were affordable housing in the Olympic villages of Banyoles (rowing) and Seu d'Urgell (rowing in savage waters). The same applied to telecommunications facilities, hotels and offices. The impact of the new flats in the municipality was the 20% of the total new construction 1987-1992, whereas it was the 5% of the total in the metropolitan region.
- **Institutional consensus** on making 450,000 million Pesetas worth of public investments, split between the Spanish Government (41%), the Catalan Government (32%), Barcelona city Council (18%) and provincial and metropolitan administrations (90%).
- **Development of an ad hoc management formula** between the Spanish and Catalan governments which established *Holding Olímpico* (Olympic Holding Company). The holding company managed 43% of public sector investment, including the Olympic Village.
- **Importance of the economic regional impact of investments.** They was about 1.8% of annual Catalonia's GDP over 6 years, creating 128,000 man-year jobs or approximately 20-25% of total employment created in the city. The employment increase during the high economic cycle 1986-1991 was of about 130.000 jobs in the municipality and 348.000 jobs in the whole Metropolitan Region. The discussion about job creation is between 59.000 per year (Brunet 1993) and 25-30.000 jobs per year (Raymond 1994)
- **Importance of “underground infrastructure”,** in the total investment. A great deal of projects was in this kind of infrastructure such as sewers, storm drains, and service galleries along the 35 Km. of the new ring road. Those works are now facilitating the telecommunications cable construction in the city.
- **Integration of the Olympic project with the broader Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan (1994-1998).** It looked beyond the event itself. Transport infrastructure represented 42% of total investment. Barcelona's historic city centre received at the same time than the Olympics a considerable slice of municipal investment: 38,000 million Pesetas of municipal investment over 6 years, while “Olympic” investments received 79,000 million Pesetas.
- **Some of the benefits from these investments appeared years later.** There were 4.1 million overnight stays by tourists in 1991. This figure rose to about 7 million in 1997, equivalent to some 3 million tourists⁶, with American visitors making up the most important group. The number of three star hotel rooms or more was 10,812 in 1991, which grew to 15,076 rooms in 1995. The cruisers in the Port reached 500.000 passengers in 1997, being the first Port of this kind in the Mediterranean. Although it is more difficult to assess the impact on the attraction of economic activity due to the Games, Barcelona ranks currently in the 6-7th place in Europe for business location interest according Healey & Baker Inquiry, and the first one in “quality of life for employees”.
- **Investment in the Olympic Games was set at a “reasonable” level.** The City Council's and Catalan Government's investments together represented 18-20% of their total investment in the period between 1986 and 1992, while the Spanish Government improved on its past investment in Catalonia by 40% over a 6 year period. This additional investment from the Central Government was surely the “incremental public investment” due to the Olympics, because the rest is a **project concentration** (Ring Road, Olympic Villages especially) rather than territorial concentration. The whole investment of the Central

⁶ Let's remember that they have been more than 7 million in 2016.

Government was near 1.700 million \$ and financed 50% of the Ring Road (1.000 million \$ approximately)⁷.

- An economic and management summary: every Peseta spent by the City Council during the 5 years period 1987-1992 was effectively matched by 14 Pesetas in total public and private spending.

Both the effort put in and the circumstances were unique. Some doubts come from the use of the world events, and especially of its availability for the use of many cities. Barcelona however has used along its history extensively of these events, like 1888 and 1929 Universal Expositions, to transform the city.

Now, however, Barcelona is an example of an important decreasing of Central and Regional Government investments from 1993 to 1998 despite the important deficits in Port and Airport enlargement, High Speed train networks and central station, environmental equipment and public transport. This non-municipal finance is the main doubt for the future.

The main strong points of the Olympic experience are the global-cultural effect ("Barcelona in the world map"), the urban transformation through an infrastructure project, the consensus among public administrations and the partnership public-private. The weaknesses (if any!) were the increase in the housing prices, the overestimation of the office demand and the limited public transport investments. The increase in prices has indeed social consequences and territorial consequences for the decentralisation process (MMAMB 1995 and Nel-lo 1998), although it is an analysis going out of the scope of this paper⁸. The 800 new affordable flats in two decentralised Olympic villages (Banyoles rowing venue and Seu d'Urgell wild waters rowing venue) and the renewal of the "Old City", were little compensation for the high standard and expensive new flats in the Poblenou (2.200 units for athletes), Montigalà (600 units for journalists) and Vall d'Hebrón (600 units for referees) Olympic villages.

The GDP per capita of the Catalonia region was about 83% of the European Union average at the beginning of the eighties (EU12). Despite the important level of unemployment from the 1992-1994 crisis, in 1994, the GDP reached the 94% of the European average. The Games strongly collaborated in that evolution.

Cities need integrated, strategic projects if they are to develop. According van der Berg (1999) cities want and need to be more "attractive" and more "accessible". Future metropolitan infrastructure projects in Barcelona have been estimated in 1,9 billion Pesetas (11,5 billion US\$) and they are directed to increase the accessibility in the European network and the attraction of economic activity to improve global competitiveness. The Forum of Cultures – Barcelona 2004 aims to collaborate to the fulfilment of these projects.

End of the quotation, from Clusa 1999.

Also from Clusa 1999-2002:

⁷ Millet (1995) evaluated the "Non Games hypothesis" in a delay in investments of 3-3.000 million\$.

⁸ Today after the 8 years crisis these weaknesses appears as more important



Olympic Experience- Strong points

- Usefulness of a world event as a means of concentrating public and private investment and solving infrastructure shortfalls
- Integration of the Olympic project with the broader Barcelona 2000 Strategic Plan
- Public-private partnerships (60-40)
- Institutional consensus
- Development of an *ad hoc* management formula: HOLSA (43% of public investment)
- Leading role played by the Barcelona City Council



Olympic Experience- City Marketing Lessons

- Importance of the economic regional impact: employment increase (20-25% in 6 years).
- Usefulness as a means of improving the external image of the city and the external communications.
- Increasing attraction of economic activity: 63.000 € foreign investment to Catalonia since 1993. 5.500 in 2016
- Tourism increase:
 - 17 million in 2016
 - 3 million in 1997
 - 2 million in 1992



Olympic Experience- Weak points (if any!)

- Limited public transport investments
- Overestimation of office demand
- Increase in housing prices or economic cycle?: consequences for the decentralisation process



Key Issues – Some Urban Policy Implications

- World Event necessary? ("Festivalisation of cities"?)
 - Sport? Cultural? Religion?
 - Economic attraction and marketing independently of events



Key Issues – Requirements in order to maximise impacts:

- An Urban Strategy – I-III Barcelona Strategic Plan
- Good quality metropolitan infrastructure (public transport, communications, environmental...)
- Inclusion of Real Estate operations and private finance (Poblenou 22@, Zona Franca Logistic Area.....)
- Consensus and synergy between public and private sectors
- Consensus among public administrations
- Financial Times (1999): "Barcelona, a success story of a proud and purposeful city".



Questions to examine- After the Olympics

- Olympic Games: an infrastructural operation with the sports as an "excuse", a "reason" or a "catalyst". The financial and management aspects.
- After the Olympics, with current needs of metropolitan infrastructures: 2004 FORUM OF CULTURES as a new "event", "excuse" or "reason" to get investment?
- Lessons for future urban renewal operations associated or not to world events

MAIN DECISIONS IN BARCELONA92 OLYMPIC GAMES

We have listed below some of the main decisions taken by planners and politicians, if they could be useful to other cities, being the most featured characteristics of the so called *1992 Barcelona model*

- Olympic village near the city centre opening the city to the sea, with beaches. Samaranch suggested 10-15 km away in a *friend's premises*; but as far as it was not accepted he did not insist, according CEO Abad in ARA special issue. Some professionals also wanted to evaluate a decentralised location in Vallès, 25 km away from the centre, in order to decentralise urban growth (like myself, with an academic!)
- Mechanical scales in the Montjuic mountain to reach the Stadium needed a very small investment and was a very useful and sustainable mean of transport.
- The jumper into swimming pool with the view of Sagrada Familia and the whole city picture, the design of torch or the *Olympics pet* (COBI) could be considered as

- *intangible benefits*, but they have collaborated very much to *put Barcelona in the world map* and to attract visitors after the games.
- Decentralised venues for different sports: the most important Banyoles (lake) and Seu d'Urgell (wild waters river)
- The more than 40.000 volunteers already registered backing the initial bid
- The volunteers working for free during the one month event
- The ring roads, giving *centrality* to the peripheral and under equipped neighbourhoods
- The use the event to cover the huge deficits in the sewerage deficient network
- To celebrate a athletes European championships one year before the games in order to check the quality of the installations. Thanks to raining it allows to mend the works
- To concentrate around the ring road most of the Olympic venues in the central municipality.
- Opening and Closure ceremonies:
 - o Surely less spectacular than the 007 agent meeting the Queen, jumping from the helicopter, and entering in the stadium with the complicity of mending the dress.
 - o Barcelona: guitars and *rumbas* (the music *friends for ever* half rock and half *flamenco* in the closure ceremony
 - o Barcelona Mediterranean sea history, later imitated by Beijing and London
 - o ...The image of jumper in the swimming pool with the view of all city and SF...
 - o To put the Catalan anthem **music**, first, before the Spanish anthem **music**, in the opening and closure ceremonies, to compensate identities sensibilities **and for avoiding whistles**

(Also see Acebillo 2017 article, in the annexes, about the technical and ethics requirements)

ABOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE:

Presentation:

The reasons of the delay is that the collection of questionnaires, and its results, have just finished, and we would like to put the arguments and recommendations in relation to *planetary events* , in general, and to the Paris Olympic bit, in particular, through the Barcelona experience, in the same order you put the questions and hypothesis to the panel.

So you will find attached the *excel file* with the answers already received and a *word file* with the summary. The file can be printed in 4 pages, with the option *all sheets*

Please feel free to send any comments, criticisms and recommendations for the paper, according these materials.

We have received 21 questionnaires (7 from the ECSP members and 14 from Barcelona/ Catalonia planners associations) until yesterday. Indeed it could be better but the samples reached the 5% of the universes, which is considered normal in internet /mail surveys, according our information. We will receive soon two new questionnaires from California academics who knows Barcelona since long time ago. The comments received are very interesting and useful for the paper.

In fact, we planned to put a questionnaire to have a quantitative summary of the opinions in Barcelona about the heritage of the Olympics92, because there are some opinions against in different intensities, as they appears in ARA newspaper of May the 21st, for instance. Also recently, Juli Ponce, an academic from the law field, produced a paper entitled *Old Barcelona model vs Newer real Barcelona*, with important criticisms to the Olympic heritage and the so called *Barcelona model* from the 90s . It was especially with relation to the two following questions and results:

7. How does the city of Barcelona 1992 see the realization of this vision and the evolution of its heritage 25 years later?

TOTAL	Highly Positive	62%	Plainly Positive	19%	Total first 2 answers: 81%
CAT SAMPLE		85%		8%	Total first 2 answers: 92%
CAT SAMPLE	Positive with more clears than obscures			8% 100%	

11. Conclusions of the feedbacks and prospects on the hosting of world events in benefit of the population

TOTAL	Very high benefits	19%	High benefits	48%	Total first 2 answers: 67%
CAT SAMPLE		31%		54%	Total first 2 answers: 85%

So now, we are reasonably happy with the results and we hope it will be useful to the audience. The sample meets the requirement of being more than 5% of the university, which is a fair sample in mailing surveys, according our information.

The respondents came from the following associations.

European Council of Spatial Planners, on 29 June 2017
29 June 2017
Cities and the Olympic and Paralympic Games, feedback and prospective, How can World Events benefit the population hosting them?

DATA FILE

SAMPLE- NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED		23		Sample Representa- tiveness
		SAMPLE	UNIVERSE	
ECTP- CEU / FIU - SAMPLE				
European Council of Spatial Planners - Conseil Européen des Urbanistes,				
ECTP-CEU	8	7	150	4,7%
FIU		1		
CAT - SAMPLE				
CAT- CETU-CEC	15	1	20	5,0%
CAT-Professionals		2		
CAT-AAUC		2		
CAT-ADM		1		
CAT-ECSP		1		
CAT- ACTU		8	250	5,6% (estimation)
TOTAL ANSWERS		23	23	
European Council of Spatial Planners - Conseil Européen des Urbanistes,		European Council of Spatial Planners - Conseil Européen des Urbanistes, ECTP-CEU		
ECTP-CEU		des Urbanistes, ECTP-CEU		
Catalunya - Professionals		CAT-Professionals		
Associació d'Arquitectes Urbanistes de Catalunya		CAT-AAUC		
Catalunya- Public Administration		CAT-ADM		
Catalunya- Members of ECSP		CAT-ECSP		
Urban and Territorial Economics Comission - Catalunya Economist Association		CAT- CETU-CEC		
Associació Catalana de Tècnics Urbanistes		CAT- ACTU		
Federación Iberoamericana de Urbanistas, FIU.		FIU		

The summary of the results are presented in the following table:

QUESTION	MAIN ANSWER	%	SECOND ANSWER	%	% FIRST AND SECOND ANSWER		
1. The involvement of spatial planners in the sustainable development of cities and territories CAT SAMPLE	Deter- minant	74% 69%	Rele-vant	26% 31%	100% 100%		
2. Hosting a planetary event in the City. What do local residents expect? CAT SAMPLE	High expec-	70% 85%	Me-dium expec-	26% 15%	96% 100%		
3. Hosting a planetary event in the City. How can elected officials meet these expectations? CAT SAMPLE	Deter- minant	65% 62%	Rele-vant	22% 31%	87% 92%		
4. How the games make it possible. Urban acupuncture CAT SAMPLE	Agree	26% 31%	Par-tially agree	52% 62%	78% 92%		
5. How the games make it possible. To associate and combine all the City forces CAT SAMPLE	Agree	87% 85%	Par-tially agree	13% 15%	100% 100%		
6. The organization of the games creates a shock and engages urban regeneration towards a new long-term vision of the prosperity of the city and its inhabitants. CAT SAMPLE	Agree	61% 69%	Par-tially agree	35% 31%	96% 100%		
7. How does the city of Barcelona 1992 see the realization of this vision and the evolution of its heritage 25 years later? CAT SAMPLE	Highly Posi-tive	57% 85%	Plainly Posi-tive	17% 8%	74% 92%	Posi-tive with more clears than obs-cures	No opinion
8. Cooperation between the various municipalities and between companies, local government and civil society is obviously essential when receiving the "planetary event"? CAT SAMPLE	Highly essen-tial	91% 100%	Partial-ly essen-tial	9% 0%	100% 100%		
9. How has the preparation of the Games and world events had sustaining impact on the territorial cohesion of the regions that have welcomed them? CAT SAMPLE	High impact	33% 50%	Me-dium impact	48% 42%	81% 92%		
10. How do the Games and world events engage cities and regions in the energy transition and taking into account climate change and environmental protection at the heart of public spaces? CAT SAMPLE	Fully enga- gement	41% 58%	Medium enga- gement	27% 25%	68% 83%		
11. Conclusions of the feedbacks and prospects on the hosting of world events in benefit of the population CAT SAMPLE	Very high benefits	17% 31%	High bene- fits	43% 54%	61% 85%	Medium benefits	
12. What is your opinion about the following sentence: A SUCCESSFUL STORY OF A PROUD AND FRUITFUL CITY (Financial Times de 11 de marc de 1999) CAT SAMPLE	Agree	43% 39%	Par-tially agree	22% 22%	65% 61%	22% 15%	83% 100%
13. What is your opinion about the following sentence: OLYMPIC GAMES WERE PASSION, PRIDE AND PROFIT....A LA VILLE DE..... BAR...SSA....LONA.. SOON:.....A LA VILLE DE PARIS CAT SAMPLE	Agree	39% 38%	Par-tially agree	22% 0%	61% 38%	No opinion	
						30% 30%	96% 91%
						35% 54%	96% 92%
						BCN values higher because 1992 results, in general	

The answers to the questionnaire are presented below incorporating all the comments received from the respondents, marked in red the most relevant ones. We understand that the comments are clear enough in order to understand what measures and policies should be undertaken to maximise social, economic and environmental benefits and to minimise costs.

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The involvement of spatial planners in the sustainable development of cities and territories

	Deter- minant	Rele- vant	Irre- levant	No opinion
TOTALS	17	6	0	0
	74%	26%		
CAT SAMPLE	9	4	0	0
	69%	31%		

Comments:

- should be in any case determinative
- depending on the influence capacity in each city
- depending on the quality of the proposals in the context of *incrementalism* ideology
- variable according *urban cultures* and the *democratic governance level* of each city
- the success of the Barcelona OOGG was to finish great infrastructures (Ring Roads, Olympic village...) already planned some decades ago. Properly, the OOGG did not plan great infrastructures, only managed their construction
- it should be determinant
- Good (pride) but also bad (fear) expectations

2. Hosting a planetary event in the City. What do local residents expect?

	High expec- tations	Me- dium expec- tations	Low expec- tations	No opinion
TOTALS	16	6	1	0
	70%	26%		
CAT SAMPLE	11	2	0	0
	85%	15%		

Comments:

- They were Barcelona's expectations in that moment. However and in general expectations depend on the type of event and the ability to get excited about in the city (which may vary over time)
- I think they haven't high expectations for city itself and themselves when the City is hosting a planetary event
- Especially at the beginning of the bid, because it happens 8 years, at least, before the event. However, in the case of Barcelona, the more than 40.000 volunteers quickly registered as soon as the project to bet was settled, means that in some cases expectation could be high, for different reasons.
- High expectations, but better to discard it
- Good (pride) but also bad (fear) expectations

3. Hosting a planetary event in the City. How can elected officials meet these expectations?

	Deter- minant	Rele- vant	Irre- levant	No opinion
TOTALS	15 65%	5 22%	0	3
CAT SAMPLE	8 62%	4 31%	0	1

Comments:

- The possible answers do not seem to fit with the question. Elected officials can meet expectations by working to achieve the necessary consensus so that as much of the population as possible gets involved in the event.
- I do not understand very well the question. In any case I think **the attitude and the success of politicians are determinant to meet the expectations of the population (with the understanding that it was also important to create them)**
- they could hearing the people and the needs of the city
- Because they put the objectives of all kinds (social and economic)
- In a good model of democratic governance is a key political role of ensuring that investments and improvements aim to be lasting and not just temporary and cyclical. The key is the model of the city the day after.
- I do not think I understand the question
- **Which "officials": of the City and/or of the Event? The classic "how way" is, of course, to explain the "advantages" – and to underestimate the "disadvantages" ; the problem is that everyone knows or believes to know that it is not profitable when the profitability is the first criterion to accept or not this sort of Event ; and the second is now the security...**

4. How the games make it possible. Urban acupuncture

	Agree	Par-tially agree	No agree	No opinion
TOTALS	6 26%	12 52%	4	1
CAT SAMPLE	4 31%	8 62%	1	0

Comments:

- The Olympic Games tend rather to carry out large operations of urban transformation in concrete spaces
- Punctual interventions throughout the city
- OOGG demand a lot of new infrastructure and venues. Some of them could be obtained by *urban acupuncture* (even the Montjuïc main Stadium could be included in these category). But *acupuncture* is a Council policy associated with all its management
- Something more than urban acupuncture; it needs to know big challenges and take advantage of the moment to correct the deficits of the city
- It depends on the site and how acting is. Very different from the case of Barcelona (multiple focus of the city and the region), the Athens (actions quite extra- little transformation of the existing city) or London (Acting on a highly concentrated area of urban renewal, industrial obsolete)
- **The Olympic Games are more than acupuncture**

- Needs always big infrastructures (of course, perhaps some already exist) and finally, only a few number of site for logistic reasons

5. How the games make it possible. To associate and combine all the City forces

	Agree	Par-tially agree	No agree	No opinion
TOTALS	20	3	0	0
	87%	13%		
CAT SAMPLE	11	2	0	0
	85%	15%		

Comments:

- Both techniques - synchronized
- If a broad political and social consensus is achieved previously
- Two possibilities are perfectly compatible, although they are only possibilities
- OOGG could be a common objective for all society. Private economic institutions backing local, national and state governments are essential to win the bid, giving an image of unity backing the Council leadership
- Consensus is a key factor as cohesion factor, although it is difficult to share political gains and image. The consensus is the most precious value for society
- The involvement of citizens, who mostly felt 'the transformations like themselves', was indispensable to the success of the event. Serra and Samaranch were getting the Games. But what was decisive were the individuals excellence that managed the games as Joan Miquel Abad.
- All forces is impossible

6. The organization of the games creates a shock and engages urban regeneration towards a new long-term vision of the prosperity of the city and its inhabitants.

	Agree	Par-tially agree	No agree	Agree
TOTALS	14	8	1	0
	61%	35%		
CAT SAMPLE	9	4	0	0
	69%	31%		

Comments:

- It must be well run from the Administration, can not be left to market forces
- In any case it depends on the Games project, ie the type of actions proposed and the spatial distribution of these
- Depends on the city, because long-term vision of the prosperity could be established with OOGG and without. But the *Olympic bid* forces to have a ten years term future vision of the city, at least. In the case of Barcelona, the long term vision was the plan for *6 new centralities*
- The organization of the Games creates a shock and engages urban regeneration towards a new long-term vision for the prosperity of the city and its inhabitants. Or not?
- Agree in the case of Barcelona. In other cases did not happen
- IF the infrastructures built for the Event are totally *salvaged*; otherwise what is gained on a side is lost in the other side

7. How does the city of Barcelona 1992 see the realization of this vision and the evolution of its heritage 25 years later?

	Highly Posi-tive	Plainly Posi-tive	Posi-tive with more clears than obs-cures	More clears than obs- cures	More obs- cures than clears	Nega- tive	Highly nega-tive	No opinion
TOTALS	13	4	2	0	0	0	0	4
	57%	17%						17%
CAT SAMPLE	11	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	85%	8%	8%					0%

Comments:

- I do not know the views of citizens
- The *heritage* itself has been highly positive because it produced a substantial increment in local and regional infrastructure (sport facilities with renewal of abandoned venues – Stadium-, ring roads, sewerage renewal, airport, tele- communications, new housing in Barcelona – private of high price -, and social in the sub venues of Banyoles and Seu d'Urgell...), and at the same time the *intangible* of putting *Barcelona in the world map. I would not say that OOGG had *costs*; better to say that private money was not enough to meet more social objectives in social housing (Poble Nou Olympic village urbanisation- with the clearance of old factories and railroads- was self-financed mainly by selling the parcels) and public transport . If any, the movement of manufacturing to the I could not say by any means *the monster birth of the monster* (Delgado, ARA May 2917), because they brought the successful tourist affluence (near 8 million last year, form 2,5 millions in 1992) in the next years after 1992 or *buble* in some way
- Despite the critical voices arising from mass tourism and gentrification processes. But without the boost of the Games, Barcelona would not be in the world map
- City won infrastructures, opened to the sea, a new Barcelona, etc. There are still shortcomings.
- Highly Positive, I think in general
- we are not inhabitants of Barcelona and do not know if the exceptional regeneration of Barcelona is totally/ partially or not due to the OG.

8. Cooperation between the various municipalities and between companies, local government and civil society is obviously essential when receiving the *planetary event*?

	Highly essen-tial	Partial-ly essen-tial	No essen- tial	No opinion
TOTALS	21	2	0	0
	91%	9%		
CAT SAMPLE	13	0	0	0
	100%	0%		

Comments:

- Not only for the *unity image* required by the bid, but mainly for finance and venues availability
- Again, in the case of Barcelona. In other cases have been State or business enterprise operations with minimal cooperation.

9. How has the preparation of the Games and world events had sustaining impact on the territorial cohesion of the regions that have welcomed them?

	High impact	Me-dium impact	Low impact	No impact at all	No opinion
TOTALS	7	10	2	0	2
	33%	48%			
CAT SAMPLE	6	5	0	0	1
	50%	42%			8%

Comments:

- Depending on the structure of the different venues and political leadership, it can impact only in the metropolitan area, without extension to the regional context. On a wider scale, it could accentuate territorial imbalances.
- I do not understand well the question. If it is the impact of Barcelona Games to the metropolitan region and to Catalonia, I would say that there was a positive impact because the broad distribution of some activities and installations
- Indeed it helps but territorial cohesion depends mainly in the *work market* and its inequalities in each society in each economic situation
- Despite the Games are awarded to a particular city, its celebration affect the whole urban, social and economic nearby
- It can be positive or negative impact as well.
- It depends a lot on the different cases (MEDIUM IMPACT?)

10. How do the Games and world events engage cities and regions in the energy transition and taking into account climate change and environmental protection at the heart of public spaces?

	Fully engagement	Medium engagement	Low engagement	No engagement at all	No opinion
TOTALS	9	6	6	0	1
	41%	27%			
CAT SAMPLE	7	3	2	0	0
	58%	25%			

Comments:

- It totally depends to be chosen as a fundamental criteria of the project. If it is not, it has no impact whatsoever. However, in Beijing 2008, which could be suspended due to high pollution, at least served to highlight the environmental problems of the city
- I understand that the question "How should involve ...?"
- Increase environmental protection is one of the objectives of any Council at any time. OOGG can encourage to fulfil higher standards in a little period of time
- In fact, "it would have to imply." The global nature of the Games, its significance and impact are the perfect setting for education measures and commitments to society and governments of the major challenges facing the mankind
- They should have a high involvement, but it is not.
- They should lead to a high involvement
- For years now the IOC is demanding environmentally friendly treatment by the Olympic cities

11. Conclusions of the feedbacks and prospects on the hosting of world events in benefit of the population

	Very high benefits	High bene-fits	Me-dium bene-fits	Low bene-fits	No bene-fits at all	No opinion
TOTALS	4	10	5	3	0	1
	17%	43%	22%			
CAT SAMPLE	4	7	2	0	0	0
	31%	54%	15%			

Comments:

- What I mean is that if you do things well, world events can produce significant benefits (though often indirect) to the population.
- it could be bigger
- In the *incremental* vision of planning and local policy
- **Benefits should high or very high, otherwise spending makes no sense**
- Again in the case of Barcelona. Other organizations have done deplorable roles
- The main benefit is improving the *image of the city* outside (e.g. in city competition) but directly there will be less benefit for inhabitants
- **There is a big difference between Athens and Barcelona for instance...**

12. What is your opinion about the following sentence: a successful story of a proud and fruitful city (Financial Times de 11 de marc de 1999)

	Agree	Par-tially agree	No agree	No opinion
TOTALS	10	5	1	7
	43%	22%		30%
CAT SAMPLE	8	0	1	4
	62%	0%		31%

Comments:

- It can be fine for Barcelona, Beijing or Sydney. I do not think that applies to Rio de Janeiro, Athens or Atlanta
- ***story*, *success*, *pride*, *fruitfulness*...they are all elements (or at least the most - - - important ones) to an fine advertisement of any *city***
- I do not know the case well enough

13. What is your opinion about the following sentence: Olympic games were Passion, Pride and Profit....a la ville de..... Bar...ssa....lona..soon:.....a la ville de Paris

	Agree	Par-tially agree	No agree	No opinion
TOTALS	9	5	1	8
	39%	22%		35%
CAT SAMPLE	5	0	1	7
	38%	0%		54%

Comments:

- I think it was enthusiasm rather than passion, but in any case it seems very well borrow the phrase of the Economist
- A very wise comment
- It could be applied to all cities, indeed.
- **..And efficient management.**

- So were unforgettable moments for the people who live them

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Let's remember that our survey presents the following results for Catalan respondents (with no answers in the negative alternatives):

7. How does the city of Barcelona 1992 see the REALIZATION OF THIS VISION AND THE EVOLUTION of its heritage 25 years later?

CAT SAMPLE (14) Highly Positive 85% / Plainly Positive 8% / Positive with more clears than obscures 8% / Total: 100%.

Our main thesis is that the Olympics were very positive for Barcelona at that time in terms of new infrastructure and social facilities, with an impressive leadership of the Council and its Mayor Maragall, and the finance of the investment in partnership with the private sector, at similar parts, as Acebillo has remembered recently. The Olympics were an excuse to justify more investment in the city from Central and Regional administrations to cover existing deficits, in a proportion of 80% of the public side, also at equal proportions between the two supra-local administrations, located in Barcelona municipality but also in decentralised venues in the region. Important to remember also, according Esteban that "the success of the Barcelona OOGG was to finish great infrastructures (Ring Roads, Olympic village...) already planned some decades ago. Properly, the OOGG did not plan great infrastructures, only managed their construction". Let's remember also that the investment of one monetary unit financed by the Council brought 14 units in overall to the city, up to a total investment accounting for around 10% of the regional GDP (being a reference the 5% for the 2012 London Olympic Games in relation a much higher Greater London GDP).

The Olympic Games in Barcelona in 1992 were a landmark for the City, clearly marked a before and a later. Since the demolition of the walls of the medieval city and the extension of urban expansion in the nineteenth century, there has been no other physical transformation of Barcelona so profound.

The Olympic Games broke the obsolete manufacturing barrier, infrastructures and slums that plugged the overture of the City to the sea. Barcelona was until 1992 a coastal and port city but with backs to the sea encased between the mountain and the two rivers and the insurmountable coastal wall (industries, railways, slums): an "inner" city, introverted and centripetal.

The rupture and elimination of the coastal barrier and the overture of the City to the sea implied the transparency and permeability of its main facade, which has deeply affected the urban center of gravity, which has moved powerfully towards the City "open" to infinity from sea. It is not alien to this maritime splendor the public treatment of the first line of sea. Fundamentally the beaches: 13 km of artificial beaches were built on a powerful green strip and promenade. There are few cities in the world that can easily be reached by walking, cycling in public transport from the urban centre to great beaches of fine sand. The benign climate of Barcelona allows bathing for six months a year, where the beaches are full of people.

The Olympic Games of 1992 brought to the city from the point of view of the physical transformation of the city also some deep infrastructural changes of modernization, possibly not so visible but of powerful incidence in the city. Taking advantage of the great urban operation, the Council embarked on a structural transformation and renovation of the water supply infrastructure, quite obsolete. Every year, when a torrential rain fell, the slums of the city flooded.

Closely linked to the ephemeris of the Olympic Games, the entire communications infrastructure was restructured, and two large towers were built. Finally, what was the great infrastructural work of the operation of the Olympic Games, which absorbed almost half of the budget, was the construction of a large urban highway, a 40km belt that broke and crushed the continuous built around the city. Apart from the functionality at the service of the private vehicle, this ring-barrier marked the powerful division between the city between center and suburban suburbs. Real estate prices have since clearly reflected this border between the central city buoyant capital, power nucleus and the second-tier dependent metropolitan area that surrounds

But after recent 8 years crisis initiated with the burst of the *construction bubble* in 2007-2008, with a loss of near 20% of the employment, and also the conversion of Barcelona in an important *tourist destination* (up to 7 million in 2016; a little figure, however, in comparison with Paris or London) with the danger *to die of success*, has put in the so called *Barcelona model* some important responsibilities, although probably more than it should deserve.

We must appreciate, therefore, the Delgado (*the birth of a monster*!) and Ponce (*the old Barcelona model vs a newer real Barcelona*!) criticisms because they help to produce sound social, housing and environmental measures for the severe actual urban problems, in a economic situation of still slow recuperation. Let's remember what professor Calavita has pointed out recently: *Manuel Delgado, in his The birth of a monster raises very good questions about how the city has become a "monster" a city where its citizens cannot afford to live, that has lost its soul. This is happening in San Francisco/Bay Area and other highly successful cities in the world. It is not the fault of the Olympics. It is the fault of the Global economy and the inability of cities to counteract it, to put limits on "prosperity." Very difficult politically and too many powerful interests that benefit from growth.*

In our opinion, as a complementary thesis, with the 25 years distance, probably with a 50% affordable housing in the 4300 flats of the Poblenou Olympic village and with underground enlargement investments (despite it would increase the public bill around an additional 25%, at least), the high positive balance would be also a high social balance. It is in the line of what professor Weiner has remembered us: *One failing of the Olympics is the promise to leave a legacy of affordable housing. Instead, the Olympic Village quarters were sold on the open market and are now some of the most expensive residential properties in Barcelona. In a city with a severe shortage of rental units for young people and lower-income families, the loss of these units as socially-owned and -regulated housing represents a lost opportunity that still resonates today*.

And that the seeds of the proposals were sown in the 70s on the courage and commitment of the Associacions de Veïns (Neighbourhood associations) fighting for better quality of life in the city against Franco dictatorship, but also that probably without the Barcelonan person of Samarach (with a past of dictatorship collaboration) help from the Olympic International Committee, since 1975-77, still in the dictatorship, the games could not come to Barcelona.

So the paper has presented the positive experience of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona (surely *a successful story of a proud and fruitful city*) and also some recommendation other cities trying to host *planetary events* to diminish the social costs of necessary *urban marketing* policies (surely being *Passion, Pride and Profit*) and infrastructure implementation in this kind of events of infrastructure construction concentration, and, using the answers to our questionnaire, how to increase the social and environmental benefits, in the line of the questions and hypothesis our secretariat put to the panel of this professional meeting. We want to see soon the Olympic bid won by the ville of Paris, as 31 years ago was for the *ville de Bar..ssa..lona*!.

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ANNEXES

JOSEP ACEBILLO

Repairing the past and preparing the future: (ARA, 21 maig 2017, pàg 52)

On 1980 we had initiated, with success, from the council, what we called "urban acupuncture", by which the city was provided with more than 150 new public spaces. But that was not enough to overcome the huge urban accumulated deficits. So, without abandoning the punctual projects, it was necessary to enlarge the scale and complexity of the interventions and for that we had the "Olympic project".

The required transformation focused not only in architecture but in infrastructures and systems, which has an investment 8 times more than before. All the projects, moreover, was designed for its permanent use to its final destination, having in mind that its function during the Games was only temporal.

So the Olympic sites were located in such a way that they could "re-qualify peripheries". An important part was spent on improving mobility in metropolitan scale, with the Ring Road and in order to open to the sea the key was to choose the place where to locate the Olympic Village, in a obsolete manufacturing land with a railway. So we won six kilometers of coastline and urban beaches accessible by subway.

The aim was to initiate urban "neo- tertiary" programs to alleviate the consequences of industrial decline. Implementing innovative systems and positioning Barcelona as a touristic city. Now it's easy to label this policy as obsolete, but we must remember that today it represents an important part of the Barcelona economic base.

Many cities around the world suffered from this, but I know that the only solvent transformation from manufacturing model to the neotertiary is Barcelona. We are envied everywhere.

Another priority was to stop the systematic chaos of urban subsoil and we allocated 60% of the Barcelona council budget to systems and infrastructure. So a handful of neighborhoods stopped to be periodically flooded because we renewed a great deal of the sewerage system and collectors stopped pouring water directly into the sea to make it into an interceptor located in the coast.

These measures overcame the urban deficits, but to face the future with solvency was necessary to bet for the modernization and connecting the new neo-tertiaries thesis focused on communication and services. The computerization of systems, communications, the enlargement the airport or the construction of two telecommunications towers and the creation of a gallery of services around the Ring Road was fundamental. Thinking in terms of the future also meant rethinking the functional map. In this sense it was essential to reverse the direction of urban development from the west to the east, where there was manufacturing areas most hit by the crisis, and it was feasible to do so by dismantling the motorway junction of Glòries and the reuse of its space, which acts as the embryo of the future eastern triangle of Glòries, Sagrera, Fòrum- 22@.

This program implied a sine-qua-non condition: the strong collaboration among the institutions, the private sector of the citizens. The institutions worked efficiently, inevitably with some controversies, even giving flexibility to some programs not included initially.

The public-private collaboration had to be exemplary and could be translated into investments in equal parts, and it was reasonably fulfilled. And despite of the works inconveniences, the systematic information to the population facilitated and citizen collaboration.

It is possible to evaluate now if we reached the expectations or not, but there are two questions very clear and workable for the future: we worked very well at the technical and economic level, as well as in the ethic one and we created a fantastic spirit of innovation and collaboration among companies, professionals and workers.

The 1992 project cannot be underestimate or imitate, nor frivolous with anecdotes. It needs a critical review of what worked and what did not work, but with responsibility, because Barcelona can not lose the international leadership. In addition to criticism, the reflection is now if there is a plausible alternative project, capable of engaging the citizenship.

MANUEL DELGADO

Anthropologist, *The birth of a monster*, (ARA, 21 maig 2017, pàg 53)

In autumn 1990 there were several events summarizing what it was and it would be even more the planning policy that aimed to alter radically the urban form of Barcelona and, incidentally, their social physiognomy. Then began the reform of the Moll de la Fusta, adapted to the changes in the coastline of the city to the design of the coastal ring road. Also began the demolition of the Baths of San Miguel, the last remaining after the bulldozers halted the Astillero and San Sebastian, as well as the intimate restaurants of Barceloneta (*xiringuitos*), in one of the episodes that clearly warned lack of sensitivity of local authorities in terms of sentimental heritage of the city.

Also featured on public mobile bridge design that would unite the Portal de la Pau with the Moll de la Fusta and the shopping center that had planned, the Maremagnum. Mapfre Tower and Hotel Arts continued to grow. The house prices did nothing but grow and the flats of the Olympic Village - built on the lot that had left the neighbourhood of Icària- saw their value increase, and the new district became in one of the most expensive the city, offered in terms of exclusivity, as its continuation, Diagonal Mar. The road to the great urban mutation had to know the south of Barcelona, on the hand of the Games, and then the 22 @ and Forum of Cultures was open and seemed unstoppable. The renewal project of the *Barrio Xino* went on in the name of *sanitation* and the San Ramon block had already been demolished.

It was then, with the help of the preparations of 92 games, which was seen clearly that was going on a showcase policy that hid the commercialization of the city and its conversion into a brutal mechanism of social duality. And it was done because the worth of legitimacy granted by leftist nature: the councils emerged from the polls assumed or re- assigned to the private or mix sector the negotiations leading to the expropriation of disadvantaged or older residents in a precarious legal situation in the neighbourhoods to be renewed. No doubt they have more than fulfilled the intuitions of the few voices at that peak of the so-called Olympic spirit they recognize it as a purely rhetorical device serving *tertiarisation* and theming of Barcelona and its folding requirements to international capital: incorporation of globalization, new peripheral social re-functionalization of urban space in terms of market re- capitalist appropriation of the city ..

We began to know then, under the pretext of the Olympics, what would be a real paradigm of what is now known as *urban marketing*, a strategy to promote and sell the object of which is none other than the same city. It was then that, in the shade of a collective hallucination – the international success of the city - a metamorphosis took place in Barcelona which would not benefit citizens –unable to pay a city that no longer would never his- but of banks, construction companies, large insurance companies, hotel chains, tour operators, etc.

The Games were the confirmation that the destruction was going on of what had been a city passionate and popular. What strikes is that the responsible politicians who run this sentence appears as * leftist *, but above all more hits than those that gave rise to the monster it is Barcelona today are the same that a quarter century later they place and maintain in power a political force promised to dismantle it. These things should be politics.

NICO CALAVITA

professor, (San Diego University) – June the 15th 2017

I do feel that Barcelona was successful in transforming itself from a GRAY industrial city to a city where tourist and economic activities flock as a result of the Olympics, where the city opened to the sea, infrastructure was built, etc.. Yes, it was skilled political entrepreneurship and creative planning that made it possible. But the Barcelona success story is not something that can be emulated easily.

First, and most importantly I feel, was the unleashing of a tremendous amount of energy, good will, creativity, collaboration, synergy, etc. brought about by the transition to democracy. I remember when I was interviewing somebody about the real estate taxes increases resulting from the reform of the Cadastro (?). It was made possible by the spirit of change (We have languished for decades under the corrupted dictatorship of Franco), now we become modern; and yes, we can pay more taxes for that. There was an explosion of energy difficult to replicate anywhere else.

Secondly, as I pointed out in my article "Behind Barcelona' Success story" it was during the transition period that the seeds for the transformation of Barcelona were planted (Solans and Serratosa roles)

In 1998 I published: "La Ciudad Sostenible," *El Pais - Barcelona*, March 20, 1998, in which I praised the Olympics role, but I had also some criticisms, which I cannot remember (Olympic Village housing and little participation I think?).

I cannot find the Opinion Piece. I have looked on line. I would **really** appreciate if you could find it; for my records, but I also think that it would be very useful for this effort.

JUNE THE 20TH, 2017

I found the "Opinion" (see attached). I mention "City marketing" at the beginning. This process of evaluation of the Olympics is very difficult. I came to Barcelona 20 years ago because it seemed to be a city (perhaps the only one) that had been able to "compete" successfully while at the same time improve its Gini numbers. Economic development with equity. I think that the Olympics did that, Villaggio Olympic notwithstanding. The city needed to do what it did with the Olympics, fixing infr., access to the sea, etc. What should be analyzed is what has happened since then.

Manuel Delgado, in his The birth of a monster raises very good questions about how the city has become a "monster" a city where its citizens cannot afford to live, that has lost its soul. This is happening in San Francisco/Bay Area and other highly successful cities in the world. It is not the fault of the Olympics. It is the fault of the Global economy and the inability of cities to counteract it, to put limits on "prosperity." Very difficult politically, too many powerful interests that benefit from growth. How has the Gini coefficient changed? .Do you want to take me to Paris?□□

By the way, I hear that the City of Barcelona is looking to hire consultants to analyze how to bring start ups and financing from the states Bring More growth!!!!

ROBERT J. WEINER

professor, California Coalition for Rural Housing –June the 20th, 2017

From my perspective, since my first trip to Barcelona in the early 2000s, Barcelona has always been a city open to the sea with a thriving sea front.

However, I know that was not the case for much of the city's history. Other than the addition of Barceloneta in the 1800s, the city faced inward and the sea front was either industrial or neglected. The Olympics gave impetus to a complete transformation of the littoral that has been highly successful. The development of the Olympic Village and connection to Barceloneta have created an uninterrupted coastal esplanade with restaurants, clubs, shopping, and a lively beach scene, including importation of sand to create beaches.

Perhaps one of the most important and innovative features was the decision to enclose the coastal road that separated Barcelonins from the sea and build a pedestrian mall that allows access to the sea from multiple points. The combination of restoration of the seafront and increased access has helped change the image of Barcelona from an inward-facing, industrial, smoke-stack city to a prime tourist and recreation destination for people of all ages. Moreover, many of the improvements on Montjuic have stood the test of time and become great assets to the city, although some of the facilities are under-utilized and in ill-repair.

One failing of the Olympics is the promise to leave a legacy of affordable housing. Instead, the Olympic Village quarters were sold on the open market and are now some of the most expensive residential properties in Barcelona. In a city with a severe shortage of rental units for young people and lower-income families, the loss of these units as socially-owned and -regulated housing represents a lost opportunity that still resonates today. I hope this is helpful, Joaquim.